Tag Archives: Lateral

Searching for IoC with Redline

Redline is a free tool for investigation malicious activity through memory and file analysis. It has a lot of features for investigation but in this post, we will only mention searching for IoCs in the endpoint with Redline.

In previous post, we created an IoC to detect WinSCP.exe. Now, we will search it with Redline as the example.

We will go on with “Create an IOC Search Collector” menu in the main page of Redline. For doing this, we browse the folder that including IoCs we want to search in the PC. We have only one IoC here but if you have more IoCs in the folder, you will see all of them in “Indicators” tab.

Then we create a folder for IoC Collector and after clicking “Next” button, we show this folder. Redline creates the IoC Collector in this folder. We will now use RunRedlineAudit.bat file with the command line. Once the bat file finishes running, it will create a folder called “Sessions” and save outputs to this folder in the same directory.

Just run the “RunRedlineAudit.bat” file and wait for finishing. Then, open the “Sessions” folder. Each IoC sweep placed in its own folder calle “AnalysisSessionX”. This was our first sweep, so we click on “AnalysisSession1” folder. Our IoC report will be in “AnalysisSession1.mans” file. So, we click on this file, and it will take some time it generates the report.

When IoC report generated, we can see it on Redline tool, “IOC Reports” tab. As you can see in the screenshot, our WinSCP Indicator IoC got hits. When we click on it, we can see why this IoC got hit. Here, our IoC catch the file with its MD5 hash value and file name. With clicking on “View Details” button, we can see more details about the hit.

Creating IoCs with Mandiant IOCe

In “Open Threat Exchange” post we mentioned that shared IoCs by other parties on Open Threat Exchange. Open IoCs are nice since they are manufacturer independent and can be used in a lot of different technologies for detecting threats.

Viewing Existing IoCs

In this post, we will mention on Mandiant IOC Editor. First of all, Mandiant IOCe could be used to view open IoCs which you downloaded from different sources. Here, we will show a simple example to view an existing IoC. So, as example, we download an IoC from Open Threat Exchange. This is the IoCs of malicious files found on Pulse Connect Secure devices. This is an xml file downloaded and has 108 IoCs containing 36 MD5, 36 SHA1, and 36 SHA256 hash values. You know, IoCs are not only hashes. They can contain a lot of different attributes about the attack, but in this example, we only have hash values. Later in this post, we will create IoC with different attributes also.

After we download the IoCs as xml file, from File > New > Indicator From File menu and choose the xml file. Here, we can see all the IoCs we downloaded and if we want we can change, delete or add IoCs in that file.

Output of the xml file

Create an IoC

It is also so easy to create IoC with Mandiant IOCe. We start from File > New > Indicator menu. Firstly, IOCe provides us to give a name and description for the IoC. As the example, we will create IoC for detecting WinSCP file. Let’s check hash values of WinSCP.exe file first. MD5 and SHA256 is enough for us now.

MD5 and SHA256 values of WinSCP.exe file

From Item > File Item menu, we choose File MD5 and paste the MD5 value of the file. Let’s do the same for File sha256 menu. Additionally, we add File Name in OR logic.

Then, we can add more attributes from hundreds of items in IOCe. We tried to show some of them in the screenshot below.

Creating IoC with Mandiant IOCe

Do not forget that attributes you choose should be unique to the file, so it can be detectable and less false positives occur. Description is important while creating an IoC, since open IoC is developed to be used by everyone, and if you create an IoC, it is better to write enough description to understand by others.

Threat Hunting II – Recommendations

An effective threat hunting is critical because it is hard to think like attackers and to search for the unknown in an enterprise network. This post may help organizations for an effective and successful threat hunting.

Knowledge of Topology and Environment

The purpose of threat hunting is to find the anomalies and their sources in the network and endpoint. So, a threat hunter should know what is normal and so can understand what is not normal.

From the risk management point of view, critical assets – servers, applications, data – should be known to protect more effectively. With the knowledge of the environment, the threat hunter knows the critical assets and hunts according to this. If there is segmentation in network, it is also critical to know the network topology and networks – or vlans – of these critical assets.

It is also necessary to know which application is running on which operating system, so the threat hunter can know the weaknesses of the system and can search according to these weaknesses.

Effective Endpoint Management

For threat hunting, the most used tools are EDRs. Organizations should be sure that they installed endpoint security tools to all endpoints and detect when they removed or stopped. Asset management is something more than CMDB. It must be managed by security teams whose understanding the criticality of the lack of endpoint security tool in an endpoint.


Threat intelligence is one of the most important feeds of threat hunting. Threat hunters need to have most recent intelligence and IoCs so they cant perform hunting the latest threats. Many malicious are produced and detected every day. This situation causes a lot of noises about intel. To avoid this noise, hunters should get valuable intelligence about their organization’s sector and geolocation, and integrate these IoCs with SIEM, EDR, etc..


We all know that new tactics and techniques are created by attackers in general. The most important reason for this is while security professionals in organizations have to deal with so many different things, attackers can only focus on their target. Even if it so important to have valuable/experienced personnel, if they are dealing with different organizational missions while they are working, it will be difficult for them to think like an hacker and detect the unknown in the network. Threat hunters should focus to their mission to create their methodology and hunt. So, there should be dedicated personnels for threat hunting.

Coordination Across the Organization

Yes, threat hunters work in a strange mission, think like a hacker and search across the network but they must not work alone. A threat hunter should have a good relationships with key personnel in IT departments like network and system admins, help desk personnel and so on. With these relationships, they better understand the network, systems and more importantly the company’s and personnels’ way of doing business. For organization’s perspective, when a threat hunter finds a weaknesses during the hunting process, they inform critical IT personnel for remediation. This team working will result as a success in remediation phase of the incidents or weaknesses.


Pyramid of Pain

Intelligence is critical for hunting for the known threats but hunters should be familiar with the TTPs of the attackers against the zero day threats. Threat hunters also should be aware of the updated or newly TTPs. Only with this knowledge hunters can act like an attacker. TTPs are at the top of Pyramid of Pain (defined by David Bianco).


To disclose the anomaly or malicious activity, threat hunters should use advanced tools like EDR, NDR, SIEM, FIM, etc.. These tools will help hunter to find abnormal activities if configured properly. In different posts, we tried to explain why they should be used.

Threat Hunting I – Understanding Threat Hunting

Although Threat Hunting is nothing new, it is a very hot topic lately. Even if you have perimeter and endpoint security devices and SIEM for collecting and correlating logs from them, it is not a good way to wait for incidents coming. Without Threat Hunting, dwell time is increasing more than 150 days, and this is not acceptable anymore. While attackers are working proactively and developing new techniques day by day, security teams need to be more proactive too. Threat Hunting is the most proactive approach in an organization’s security structure and improves its security posture.

Dwell time is the dirty metric nobody wants to talk about in cyber security. It signifies the amount of time threat actors go undetected in an environment, and the industry stats about it are staggering.
Source: Extrahop

In its simplest definition, Threat Hunting is detecting abnormal activities on endpoints and network. But, what to look for hunting threats?

What to Hunt?

Threat Hunting is a continuous process. Hunters should check anything that could be an evidence of an incident.

  • Processes: Processes are important components of OSs. Adversaries may inject malicious code into hijacked processes. Therefore, hunters should check processes and child processes regularly.
  • Binaries: Hunters should check binaries with their checksum, name and other specifications.
  • Network: Network activities to specific destinations and anomalies in network should be checked.
  • Registery: Hunters should check registery key additions and modifications.

The Team

For a continuous hunting, organizations need to have threat hunters in their CSIRT. The difference between analysts and threat hunters is the proactive approach as mentioned before. Also in smaller organizations, SOC analysts may work on threat hunting but actually, a threat hunter may has more specifications than an analyst. In larger organizations, it is important to have a dedicated threat hunting leader and team. This team should has detailed knowledge about;

  • OSs: The Threat Hunting team should have knowledge about OSs that organization is using. This knowledge must include process structures, files, permissions, and registery depending on the OS. This is important because malicious files and attackers make changes in OS here. A threat hunter need to understand what is normal and what is not. Something is not normal could be a sign of an intrusion. For having this knowledge, baselines could be created for all critical systems. These baselines will help to know the normal and the anomalies.
  • Apps: Threat Hunters should have knowledge about the applications used in the organization. It is also important to know perimeter and endpoint security devices and applications used by organization.
  • Business: Threat Hunting team should have knowledge about the organization’s business so they need to follow adversaries working on the organization’s sector and geographical location. It is also important to know third party companies the organization works and communication ways with them.
  • Network: In a big and segmented network structure, it is important to know where the critical assets are.
  • The Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain: Also known as APT phases, represents the phases of an advanced attack.
  • TTPs: IoCs are important components for hunting but they provide to detect “known knowns”. TTPs are at the top of Pyramid of Pain (defined by David Bianco) and especially adversaries’ techniques and tactics should be known those are threatening the organization’s sector and location.
  • Threat Hunting Tools: In CSIRT plan, it needs to be included that which tools and techniques can be used for threat hunting. Threat hunters should have knowledge of these tools and techniques.
  • IR&H Plan: Threat hunting is only a step of proactive approach. If threat hunters successfully find an intrusion or anomaly in systems, they need to know the next step. Who should they inform? What should be done?..etc..


  • Threat Intelligence: Threat intelligence is one of the most important feeds of threat hunting. Threat hunters need to have most recent intelligence and IoCs so they cant perform hunting the latest threats.
  • EDR: Threat hunters need IoCs but also need to know how to use these IoCs. After gathering the most recent IoCs from TI platforms, an IoC sweep must be made on endpoints.
  • NDR: Just like endpoints, network traffic also need to be checked with the latest IoCs. For doing this, CSIRT need to collect all east-west and south-north network traffic. NDR devices those have AI capabilities also detect anomalies in the network.
  • SIEM: Depending on the hunt’s scope, the threat hunter may need to check IPS/IDS, proxy, DNS, firewall or some other tools’ logs. Because logs are coming from different sources, CSIRT need to collect and correlate these logs in SIEM and feeding SIEM with the latest IoCs, these logs will more meaningful.
  • FIM: We said that baselines must be created for critical systems. FIM solutions will help CSIRT to create baselines for OSs and alert analysts when an unauthorized transaction is made.

Network Detection and Response

As organizations, and security teams, we purchased many security devices for providing both network and endpoint security. However, attacks continue at the same pace, even we faced bigger attacks last year, and they are getting more sophisticated. So, what is the next step for organizations?

NDR market guide was shared last year by Gartner. As the idea, NDR uses (or must use) artifical intelligence to detect malicious behaviors, both from external threat actors and insider threats.  This means, we will no longer just store the huge network traffic data via full packet capture products, but also detect the anomalies in these captured traffic. So, NDR will play a major role in helping security team to response quicker.

Unfortunately, the only obstacle to the teams last year was not the more sophisticated attacks, but also the “new normal” made security teams so hard. Now, more users are reaching to organization’s sources, getting e-mails and downloading files out of office. Control over users’ behaviors is less and less. When that happens, the need for more sophisticated technologies is also increasing.


Even if we implement many security technologies to our structure, attacks are still going on. Now it is necessary to detect whether there is anyone inside as much as protecting the border. Honeypot technologies and EDRs have been used for this for years but these are not enough to decrease the dwell time. If you failed to prevent and detect an attacker inside your network, or an insider threat, it is always difficult to prevent data exfiltration, or your file from being encrypted.

Machine learning is the key here. The main idea is anomaly detection inside the network. The first step is to profile entire organization’s network and users’ and computers’ traffic. After having such a profiling, it will be easier to detect anomalies inside the network. Anomalies can be in different forms like data exfiltration to some rare destinations, uploading files to IP addresses without hostnames, login attempt from strange destinations (for cloud or vpn), and copying in large number of files from an smb share. We expect the NDR to catch all of that, of course more.


More otganizations are using cloud infrastructure more and more. Public, private, or hybrid, cloud infrasturctures are also a part of us. Critical files are stored and applications work there, and the responsibles are the customers for the data’s security.

Think of a scenerio like that; you have users storing files in cloud and they are working with a few of these files during their work. A user, has a permission to reach these files, downloading most of the files in a very short time, then resigns from work. Or, this user’s credentials have been compromised, and someone connected to your cloud from a country that non of your users normally connect and made anomalous behaviors. NDR must cover also cloud and detect these incidents. It is hard to implement a UEBA solution, thus, NDR can be implemented to detect insider threat.


Most of the organizations were caught unprepared for Covid situation. Users had to work at home and connected to organizations’ network or cloud from home. That means, users can connect to internet less controlled. An NDR with endpoint capabilities will also cover users at home, corralate users behaviors with your network traffic and can detect threats.

A Quick Guide for Ransomware Protection

Unfortunately, ransomware problem is growing every day, although a lot of cases we hear and tens of articles and webinars are published about it. In this post, I try to explain the Protection processes against ransomware. Then, with more posts, I will try to explain every steps deeper.

If you have been exposed to it and your files are encrypted, there is nothing much to do. So, it may be important to read these measures.

  1. Asset Management: You must know all assets in your organization, especially all assets connecting to internet. Meanwhile, you must know immediately when a new device connected to your network. Additionally, devices using Outlook is also important. A device may be able to Access to internet with restiricted policies but it can get email from outside of the organization. Restriction policies on proxys and firewalls cannot work perfectly, and always have some problems on not categorized or newly websites. So, an asset management device and a NAC solution is very important to manage devices.
  2. Do not use RDP: Remote Desktop Protocol is a common method for attackers to remotely connect to systems, or move laterally and deploy malware. Protocols like Telnet, SSH, SMB, and RDP should not be open to the internet. You should continuously scan your public IP addresses to check whether there is a protocol like these open to the internet. If you still need to open, pay attention to these;
    1. Local admin accounts should be kept in safe with a PAM solution
    2. Change the default RDP port
    3. Implement IP restriction if possible
    4. Allow remote connection only with recording systems
    5. Multifactor authentication should be implemented.
    6. Network Level Authentication (NLA) can be activated on devices. NLA provides a pre authentication step and also protects the System against brute force attacks.
    7. Implement security policies via Group Policy, and deny local changes
  1. Disable administrative and hidden shares on clients:
  1. Block some file types for incoming emails: Block emails including executive files. IF there are some file types that you cannot block because of the business, you should you some measures like sandbox for incoming emails.
  1. Backup and regularly backup tests: If you lose your all sensitive data, it is very important to have usable backups. For this, firstly, you should separate and isolate your backup network from all others. So, in a situation of compromise, backup networks will be safe. If you lose your backup data too with all data, there is no any other way other than pay the ransom.

Separating and isolating the backup network is a good start, but it is not enough. You must regularly test backup data and should be ensure that they are working. If you have an unusable backup data when you need it, it only means you spent hundereds of gigabytes for nothing.

There is no a System protecting %100 against ransomware, so backups are becoming more critical in this situation.

  1. Patch your systems regularly: Especially, systems that are open to the internet should be patched quickly. For this, you should have test systems for all your critical systems and patch these tests firstly, then take action quickly for the production systems.
  1. Awareness: %91 of the attacks begins with email. For an attacker, it s very easy to deceive a user rather than trying to find weaknesses and exploit them. Even if you have hundreds of measurements agains cyber attacks, if one of your users accept and click a malicious email, it means you can be exposed.

Third Party Connections’ Security

Do you want your partners trust you directly? Well, do you trust your third party partners directly? When adversaries  are in, they always check different ways to reach more places. So, if one of your trusted third party connection got hacked, it means that there is just a short time they find your connection, and get inside if you did not make your connection secure.

Since 2018, we saw that attacks against third party connections increased. Most of them happened because of the small organizations that are giving support in any subject to larger organizations. Because of these small organizations’ low security budget, it is very difficult to secure the network and PCs for them. Most of these organizations do not have a domain structure, security devices for networks and even endpoint protection tools. What I saw while I am working with them that these type of organizations’ users are local admin in their laptops, and only using an antivirus agent to secure the rarely patched laptop. These laptops are being used to connect to other organizations, and sometimes to keep some sensitive data about of these organizations. They are very close to get hacked, but you must not get this risk while working with them.

Third Party Connection Management in Organizations

Especially in large organizations, since policies not working properly; and maybe since there is no any policy for third party connections, circulation of staff and sudden and fast developing projets, teams can create third party connections how it is easy at that time for them. This creates an unmanaged third party connections structure and so, it becomes worse day by day.

I remember we spent at least four months to fix the third party connections in a large organization. Dozens of leased lines reaching directly to different networks inside, hundereds of S2S VPNs established years ego, has certificates with low key sizes, and etc. Lack of a basic policy like third party connections policy causes a huge waste of time and effort to fix it.

What to Do?

Whoever you are connecting, or connecting to you, you should minimize threats. Because, all organizations are the target for hackers and they all can be hacked. You should not trust anybody else about security. You should understand what security controls they apply in the organization. If they have some weaknesses to determine the attacks made to themselves, it will put you at risk.

Create a 3rd party DMZ network. This is important because these 3rd party PCs should not connect to your network directly from any zone in your firewall. These PCs are something you cannot trust directly. So, at least, a 3rd party DMZ should be created to connect and control these type of connections. If there is no any 3rd party zone and policy, in a long period of time, with some of the activities explained at the beginning, you can see many different 3rd party organizations are connecting to your network from many different zones. And it will be something unmanagable day by day. For the beginning, I suggest to create a different zone for leased line connections to the internet facing firewall, and control these connections policies there. Also, a different firewall should be implemented for S2S VPN connections. It is important to receive these connections in a different firewall and control their connections.

You should use a vendor management program. It helps you to reduce the risk, by collecting more and more information about your third party connection and should be sure they comply with standards and regulations.

You should know what security controls, endpoint security (antivirus, EDR, encryption, etc.) and data leakage prevention methods do your third party connection imply to its users. Mostly, if you do not give a laptop to users that will connect to your network, third party organiztions’ staff uses their own or that company’s PCs. That means, these computer will be connected to your network most of the time, and these PCs will contain your some sensitive information. So, it is important to know whether they are protecting these PCs while working with you.

Screen recording is also a very useful tool. It is impossible to watch directly every consultant’s actions on your network. Most of the time they work on your test servers on test zones, and unfortunately, sometimes they can work directly on production zone or can reach to production zone because of the lack of controls. A screen recording tool will be an important deterrent action for you.

MFA is must. Multi-factor authentication should be used to connect your network. Mostly I suggest time based MFA tools to use. Any time a security incident occurs in 3rd party’s network, MFA will be important to secure you.

FireEye NX SmartVision SC Killswitch

SmartVision is the lateral movement detection module of the network security product (NX) of FireEye. There are too many documents and descriptions about it on FireEye’s website, so I will not touch on it here. I just want to explain what SC Killswitch is in the SmartVision configuration, since there is no any explanation about it anywhere.

The SC Killswitch is not a user configurable setting, so there is no any command to enable or disable it even if you see it is like configurable in show menu.

#show smartvision config

It is something about status of the SmartVision module. Sometimes, some Security-Contents may have to restart SmartVision module. This SC Killswitch value indicates whether SmartVision module should be restarted or not. If this value is no;

SC Killswitch: no

this simply indicates that there is no need to restart SmartVision module.