Tag Archives: IoC

Searching for IoC with Redline

Redline is a free tool for investigation malicious activity through memory and file analysis. It has a lot of features for investigation but in this post, we will only mention searching for IoCs in the endpoint with Redline.

In previous post, we created an IoC to detect WinSCP.exe. Now, we will search it with Redline as the example.

We will go on with “Create an IOC Search Collector” menu in the main page of Redline. For doing this, we browse the folder that including IoCs we want to search in the PC. We have only one IoC here but if you have more IoCs in the folder, you will see all of them in “Indicators” tab.

Then we create a folder for IoC Collector and after clicking “Next” button, we show this folder. Redline creates the IoC Collector in this folder. We will now use RunRedlineAudit.bat file with the command line. Once the bat file finishes running, it will create a folder called “Sessions” and save outputs to this folder in the same directory.

Just run the “RunRedlineAudit.bat” file and wait for finishing. Then, open the “Sessions” folder. Each IoC sweep placed in its own folder calle “AnalysisSessionX”. This was our first sweep, so we click on “AnalysisSession1” folder. Our IoC report will be in “AnalysisSession1.mans” file. So, we click on this file, and it will take some time it generates the report.

When IoC report generated, we can see it on Redline tool, “IOC Reports” tab. As you can see in the screenshot, our WinSCP Indicator IoC got hits. When we click on it, we can see why this IoC got hit. Here, our IoC catch the file with its MD5 hash value and file name. With clicking on “View Details” button, we can see more details about the hit.

Data Collection with Redline

As we discuss before, Redline is a great tool for investigating endpoints. In this post, we will explain how to collect memory data with Redline.

First, in the main page of Redline, we click on “Create a Standard Collector” button. In the opened window, we click on “Edit your script” label and be sure we choose all we need for memory analysis. Then we create a folder for analysis and show it with browsing in the Redline window.

This process will create the data collector in the folder we choose. Then we open a cmd and run “RunREdlineAudit.bat” script in this folder.

Once the script starts to run, you can see some analysis created in “Audit” folder. Sure, it will take some time to finish the analysis.

When it finishes, click on “AnalysisSessionX.mans” file in the “Audit” folder and this will open Redline again.

This file provides us all the information that we checked at the beginning (Edit your script).

Creating IoCs with Mandiant IOCe

In “Open Threat Exchange” post we mentioned that shared IoCs by other parties on Open Threat Exchange. Open IoCs are nice since they are manufacturer independent and can be used in a lot of different technologies for detecting threats.

Viewing Existing IoCs

In this post, we will mention on Mandiant IOC Editor. First of all, Mandiant IOCe could be used to view open IoCs which you downloaded from different sources. Here, we will show a simple example to view an existing IoC. So, as example, we download an IoC from Open Threat Exchange. This is the IoCs of malicious files found on Pulse Connect Secure devices. This is an xml file downloaded and has 108 IoCs containing 36 MD5, 36 SHA1, and 36 SHA256 hash values. You know, IoCs are not only hashes. They can contain a lot of different attributes about the attack, but in this example, we only have hash values. Later in this post, we will create IoC with different attributes also.

After we download the IoCs as xml file, from File > New > Indicator From File menu and choose the xml file. Here, we can see all the IoCs we downloaded and if we want we can change, delete or add IoCs in that file.

Output of the xml file

Create an IoC

It is also so easy to create IoC with Mandiant IOCe. We start from File > New > Indicator menu. Firstly, IOCe provides us to give a name and description for the IoC. As the example, we will create IoC for detecting WinSCP file. Let’s check hash values of WinSCP.exe file first. MD5 and SHA256 is enough for us now.

MD5 and SHA256 values of WinSCP.exe file

From Item > File Item menu, we choose File MD5 and paste the MD5 value of the file. Let’s do the same for File sha256 menu. Additionally, we add File Name in OR logic.

Then, we can add more attributes from hundreds of items in IOCe. We tried to show some of them in the screenshot below.

Creating IoC with Mandiant IOCe

Do not forget that attributes you choose should be unique to the file, so it can be detectable and less false positives occur. Description is important while creating an IoC, since open IoC is developed to be used by everyone, and if you create an IoC, it is better to write enough description to understand by others.

Open Threat Exchange

Open Threat Exchange is a threat intelligence platform from Alien Vault. It is not limited to use this platform to get intel information.

When you register and log in to OTX, you can easily see the summary of the threats in “Subscribed Pulses” section.

Let’s choose a threat, called “Wiper luring the Olympic Games”. When we click, we can see details of the threat like a brief description, reference, tags for searching easily later, and TTP Id for Att&ck.

In the same page, in Indicator of Compromise section, we see IoCs of this threat. For this example, we have an MD5, a SHA1 and a SHA256 hash values as IoC. These IoCs have more details and you can easily see the details with blue “go to details” button at the right of the IoC.

We have more details here like file type, size, different hash values, metadata information, and VirusTotal check.

In the main page of the pulse, you can download the IoCs in different forms. You can easily download and use these IoCs to detect the threats.

In the Browse tab of OTX, it is classified by pulses, groups, indicators, malware families, industries and adversaries. It is valuable to search for specific threat actors and their TTPs, and IoCs to detect them.

OTX also provides to create pulses and API connection. It has a simple user interface so do not want to touch all menus here.

The Newest Ransomware: Epsilon Red

Sophos announced that analysts uncovered a new ransomware – called Epsilon Red – that developed in Go programming language. The code is placed in PowerShell script.

This malicious file is written in Go programming language and a 64-bit executable file. It is said that spreading in systems by exploiting security vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange servers. It is using vulnerabilities like CVE-2020-1472, CVE-2021-26855 and CVE-2021-27065 that recently discovered Microsoft Exchange servers vulnerabilities. Epsilon Red ransomware scans files and encrypts for ransom when it reach to the target systems. It seems like still there are more than three thousand exchange servers that including these vulnerabilities and this shows us Epsilon Red attacks would be more painful.

According to Sophos, Epsilon Red has been seen in hospitality industry in USA mostly, and it seems like one of their victims paid 4.29 BTC after being affected.

For not being affected, organizations should keep the applications up to date and detect these IoCs below to prevent this attack. Also you can read our short post about prevention agains ransomwares.

Domain:

epsilons.red

Hash:

57ee78299598170c766ff73cefca9e78b9b81ac6999e8adb61903bc89be313ba

ce5ba1e5d70d95d52b89a1b8278ff8dd4d1e25c38c90ca202b43bdc014795d78

699ffb898864bf804cf726f39b5e8168d55e44fc1584b71ba25e31b43ae543e8

35ffc1263005fd0a954deed20a7fb0cd53dbab6bb17ff8bd34559a5a124686c7

7259975d7e3b3d9d059a38f4393ab920764b46ca243e192e08f7699999382e07

172bbf46e5f46dd7a9ea0c22054b644f60efc3a9ad26a6f0e95ca57e38af60a7

9845619cb9c3612055a934c4270568391832eab40a66dbb22b1b37fa05559c92

5120998fa1482d4d0d0099d91aab2af647c0272819d7dcf792eec01c77ab9391

4d6272aeadf7fc131ac126dc07d7bfd2e878d359e5e7bb5376a67295ce05fc15

0794c8630f40f04c0e7cea40f11dc3f1a829a3be69852fe9e184aa8b7ed20797

7a8128f8788524e54a69619b69870dfd4c50db46e3eb786899f7275dab73d2d9

4eaf5e93953756bc2196bfcfb030b6eaad687fa1e8db9f47b09819f3b4315230

a9a6d35469e471666758ed5d1174edc5b650c0acb2c351213eadfb408f74bdcb

039da6b099303fdfd087bb7df94012780dfe375c67234ce495c78cf2dcf7fd9d

ee10f3a798aaa03f4ced2ddb28d2b36fe415ea2cbbd9c3b97b2a230a72d77f5c

5aa7de7eab570522c93d337d395396057033ad6596db4a0bda15d77a6d4c6c3a

84755b2177b72364918f18c62a23854e7a8a66c4f5005cc040357850adf9d811

c1f963aba616680e611601e446955e9552c69db23dabab8444718d82ad830029

8c294f1ef05df823460bd11ce34ea7860178de6bc3d9b0127a3b9c08cf62437f

Virtual Machines Roles in Growing Number of Ransomware Attacks

Symantec Threat Hunter Team published a post about evidence that an increasing number of ransomware attackers are using virtual machines (VMs) in order to run their ransomware payloads on compromised computers. The purpose of using VMs on ransomware attacks is thought to hide the malicious activities. It is stated that this method is used in order to bypass the security solutions in virtual machines and to ensure that malicious codes can be hidden in the virtual machine.

In the past, a similar attack was seen on Windows XP machines by RagnarLocker ransomware. The same method now is used in Windows 7 machines.

It is important to prevent the installation of unauthorized virtual machines in corporate networks and implement NDR solutions to capture the anomalies in the network. In addition, Symantec published these IoCs to detect;

  • 2eae8e1c2e59527b8b4bb454a51b65f0ea1b0b7476e1c80b385f579328752836 – Installer
  • 9f801a8d6b4801b8f120be9e5a157b0d1fc3bbf6ba11a7d202a9060e60b707d8 – runner.exe
  • e5291bae18b0fa3239503ab676cacb12f58a69eb2ec1fd3d0c0702b5a29246cb – VirtualBox
  • d89bd47fb457908e8d65f705f091372251bae3603f5ff59afb2436abfcf976d8 – Mountlocker
  • 8f247e4149742532b8a0258afd31466f968af7b5ac01fdb7960ac8c0643d2499 – Mountlocker

Prometei Exploits MS Exchange Vulnerabilities

A new malicious called Prometei has been determined, that including Exchange servers have ProxyLogon vulnerability to cryptocurrency network. Prometei is a modular malicious code and has different features like credential dumping, usage of the system for cryptocurrency minning, and lateral movement. Prometei has two different versions for both Windows and GNU/Linux.

Prometei exploits the ProxyLogon vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-27065 and CVE-2021-26858) and uploads China Chopper web Shell. After uploading China Chopper, attackers downloads the zsvc.exe on the victim’s machine with PowerShell. After gaining persistence, another malicious file called sqhost.exe is downloade by attacker. With sqhost.exe, attackers can use the victim system for Monero minning with using XMRig open source code. However, Prometei uses Mimikatz for lateral movement.

A more detailed investigation of Prometei can be found on the cybereason blog page. It looks like threat actors still keep using Prometei. To avoid of this risk, exchange vulnerabilities need to be eliminated fastly, and these IoCs can be used to detect and prevent Prometei.

IoCs:

File Hashs – SHA256

f0a5b257f16c4ccff520365ebc143f09ccf233e642bf540b5b90a2bbdb43d5b4

D8e3e22997533300c097b47d71feeda51dca183c35a0d818faa12ee903e969d5

b0e743517e7abf75a80b81bb7aadc9c166ac47ba89c0654ba855dda1e4d96c3e

55fc69a7e1b2371d8762be0b4f403d32db24902891fdbfb8b7d2b7fd1963f1b4

e4bd40643f64ac5e8d4093bddee0e26fcc74d2c15ba98b505098d13da22015f5

fb8f100e646dec8f19cb439d4020b5f5f43afdc2414279296e13469f13a018ca

e961c07d534bc1cb96f159fce573fc671bd188cef8756ef32acd9afb49528331

2f114862bd999c38b69b633488bcbb6c74c9a11e28b7ef335f6c77bba32ed2d6

5de7afdde08f7b8ba705c8332c693747d537fd5b1bb0e7b0c757c0f364a60eb8

dc73a88f544efc943da73c9f6535facdb61800f6205ad3dddb9adb7c6ab229ab